某車聯網App 通訊協議加密分析(四) Trace Code
一、目標
之前我們已經通過Trace Block 來比對了Unidbg和App跑的結果。現在他們運行的流程都差不多了，但是結果還是不對，今天我們就要通過Trace Code進行更細緻的對比。
v6.1.0
二、步驟
縮小Trace的範圍
Trace Code那麼好使，我們為什麼不一上來就Trace一遍？
因為Trace Code的粒度太細了，一上來就搞，跑出幾百萬行結果，根本沒法看。
我們通過Trace Block已經在逐步縮小範圍了。
JNIEnv->GetStringUtfChars("FlK6XicivmCwPSE3sk6b71m9WbWd/gYZtlajqGXhEXXjmWEZziR51rVWSEDwUUi4UN9RnoCGbLNmqI80Fiog4Sw==") was called from RX@0x4002b744[libencrypt.so]0x2b744
sub_2b8b8
sub_2b800
sub_2b800
sub_2b800
sub_2b800
sub_2b828
sub_ab6c
sub_a528
sub_ab9c
sub_a848
sub_a7e8
sub_a7c4
sub_8ee4
sub_7334
sub_8f40
sub_95e0
........
sub_a7c4
sub_8ee4
sub_7334
sub_8f40
sub_96bc
sub_9a2c
sub_9268
sub_a818
sub_a90c
sub_a928
sub_2b854
JNIEnv->ReleaseStringUTFChars("FlK6XicivmCwPSE3sk6b71m9WbWd/gYZtlajqGXhEXXjmWEZziR51rVWSEDwUUi4UN9RnoCGbLNmqI80Fiog4Sw==") was called from RX@0x4002b86c[libencrypt.so]0x2b86c
我們的目標大概率是在 0x7000 → 0xa000 這個地址範圍之類。
定位Trace Code目標
翻一翻IDA裏面的導出表
1:ida
比較閤眼緣的就這三個了，0x7184 ,0x77A4 貌似都沒有被Trace Block命中，感覺幕後大boss應該就是這個 0x8EE4
Tip:
可以在懷疑的幾個函數上加個hook，看看是否命中。
Unidbg Trace Code
emulator.attach().addBreakPoint(module.base + 0x8EE4 , new BreakPointCallback() {
@Override
public boolean onHit(Emulator<?> emulator, long address) {
System.out.println(" ====== traceCode ====== ");
UnidbgPointer pX = UnidbgPointer.register(emulator, Arm64Const.UC_ARM64_REG_X1);
byte[] bData = pX.getByteArray(0,16);
String strLabel = String.format("x0值 0x%08x", pX.peer);
Inspector.inspect(bData,strLabel);
try {
emulator.traceCode(module.base + 0x8EE4, module.base + 0x9C0C).setRedirect(new PrintStream(new File("traceCodeCar.log")));
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new IllegalStateException(e);
}
return true;
});
}
先在 0x8EE4 加個斷點，然後開始Trace Code。 參數是Trace的起始地址和結束地址，已經保存的結果文件。
從這個Trace結果來看，每16個字節去做解密。典型的AES。
Frida Trace Code
Stalker的好處很多，最大的功能是可以過反調試，所以基於Stalker去寫Trace Code,寫了好幾個版本，一直不大滿意。
前幾天發現了
http://github.com/IIIImmmyyy/frida-trace
比較帥，拿來改了改。效果很好。(只支持Arm64)
let moduleBase;
let isFirstIn = true;
let pre_regs;
let infoMap = new Map();
let detailInsMap = new Map();
function parserNextAddr(ins) {
let s = JSON.stringify(ins);
let address = ins.address;
// log("address:"+address)
let offset = address - moduleBase;
let s1 = (offset).toString(16);
let entity = {};
entity.address = offset;
return s1;
}
const byteToHex = [];
for (let n = 0; n <= 0xff; ++n) {
const hexOctet = n.toString(16).padStart(2, "0");
byteToHex.push(hexOctet);
}
function hex(arrayBuffer) {
const buff = new Uint8Array(arrayBuffer);
const hexOctets = [];
for (let i = 0; i < buff.length; ++i)
hexOctets.push(byteToHex[buff[i]]);
return hexOctets.join("");
}
function formatArm64Regs(context) {
let regs = [];
regs.push(context.x0);
regs.push(context.x1);
regs.push(context.x2);
regs.push(context.x3);
regs.push(context.x4);
regs.push(context.x5);
regs.push(context.x6);
regs.push(context.x7);
regs.push(context.x8);
regs.push(context.x9);
regs.push(context.x10);
regs.push(context.x11);
regs.push(context.x12);
regs.push(context.x13);
regs.push(context.x14);
regs.push(context.x15);
regs.push(context.x16);
regs.push(context.x17);
regs.push(context.x18);
regs.push(context.x19);
regs.push(context.x20);
regs.push(context.x21);
regs.push(context.x22);
regs.push(context.x23);
regs.push(context.x24);
regs.push(context.x25);
regs.push(context.x26);
regs.push(context.x27);
regs.push(context.x28);
regs.push(context.fp);
regs.push(context.lr);
regs.push(context.sp);
regs.push(context.pc);
return regs;
}
function getPcReg(regs) {
return regs[32];
}
function isRegsChange(context, ins) {
let currentRegs = formatArm64Regs(context);
let logInfo = "";
for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
if (i === 30) {
continue;
}
let preReg = pre_regs[i];
let currentReg = currentRegs[i];
if (Number(preReg) !== Number(currentReg)) {
if (logInfo === "") {
//嘗試讀取string
let changeString = "";
try {
let nativePointer = new NativePointer(currentReg);
changeString = nativePointer.readCString();
}
catch (e) {
changeString = "";
}
if (changeString !== "") {
currentReg = currentReg + " (" + changeString + ")";
}
logInfo = "\t " + getRegsString(i) + " = " + preReg + " --> " + currentReg;
}
else {
logInfo = logInfo + "\t " + getRegsString(i) + " = " + preReg + " --> " + currentReg;
}
}
}
//打印PC寄存器
let parse = JSON.parse(ins);
let mnemonic = parse.mnemonic; //補充str
if (mnemonic === "str") {
let strParams = getStrParams(parse, currentRegs);
logInfo = logInfo + strParams;
}
else if (mnemonic === "cmp") {
let cmpParams = getCmpParams(parse, currentRegs);
logInfo = logInfo + cmpParams;
}
else if (mnemonic === "b.gt" || mnemonic === "b.le" || mnemonic === "b.eq" || mnemonic === "b.ne" || mnemonic === "b") {
// log(ins)
let bgtAddr = getbgtAddr(parse, currentRegs);
logInfo = logInfo + bgtAddr;
}
let entity = {};
entity.info = logInfo;
let address = parse.address;
if (lastAddr === undefined) {
entity.color = getColor();
lastAddr = address;
}
else {
let number = address - lastAddr;
if (number === 0x4) {
entity.color = getColor();
}
else {
currentIndex++;
entity.color = getColor();
}
lastAddr = address;
}
pre_regs = currentRegs;
return entity;
}
let lastAddr = undefined;
let currentIndex = 0;
function getColor() {
return "";
if (currentIndex > 1) {
currentIndex = 0;
}
if (currentIndex === 0) {
return "C35"; // logger_1.LogColor.C35;
}
else if (currentIndex === 1) {
return "C97"; // logger_1.LogColor.C97;
}
else if (currentIndex === 2) {
return "C97"; // logger_1.LogColor.C97;
}
}
function getRegsString(index) {
let reg;
if (index === 31) {
reg = "sp";
}
else {
reg = "x" + index;
}
return reg;
}
function getbgtAddr(parser, currentRegs) {
let bgtAddr = "";
let operands = parser.operands;
for (let i = 0; i < operands.length; i++) {
let operand = operands[i];
if (operand.type === "imm") {
let value = operand.value;
let number = value - moduleBase;
bgtAddr = "\t block addr:" + number.toString(16);
break;
}
}
return bgtAddr;
}
function getStrParams(parser, currentRegs) {
let operands = parser.operands;
for (let i = 0; i < operands.length; i++) {
let operand = operands[i];
if (operand.type === "reg") {
//獲取value
let value = operand.value;
if (value === "wzr") {
return "\t " + "str = 0";
}
else {
let replace = value.replace("w", "");
let index = replace.replace("x", "");
let index_reg = currentRegs[index];
let changeString = "";
try {
let nativePointer = new NativePointer(index_reg);
changeString = nativePointer.readCString();
}
catch (e) {
changeString = "";
}
//讀取值
if (changeString !== "") {
index_reg = index_reg + " (" + changeString + ")";
}
return "\t " + "str = " + index_reg;
}
}
}
}
function getCmpParams(parser, currentRegs) {
let operands = parser.operands;
let cmpInfo = "";
for (let i = 0; i < operands.length; i++) {
let operand = operands[i];
if (operand.type === "reg") {
let value = operand.value;
let replace = value.replace("w", "");
let index = replace.replace("x", "");
let index_reg = currentRegs[index];
let changeString = "";
try {
let nativePointer = new NativePointer(index_reg);
changeString = nativePointer.readCString();
}
catch (e) {
changeString = "";
}
//讀取值
if (changeString !== "") {
index_reg = index_reg + " (" + changeString + ")";
}
cmpInfo = cmpInfo + "\t " + value + " = " + index_reg;
}
}
return cmpInfo;
}
function ZY_unTraceAddrEnd(){
var tid = Process.getCurrentThreadId();
Stalker.unfollow(tid);
Stalker.garbageCollect();
console.log(TAG + " ======== unTraceAddr_End");
}
function ZY_trace_Stalker_begin(soname, addr, size) {
let module = Process.findModuleByName(soname);
moduleBase = module.base;
console.log(TAG + JSON.stringify(module));
console.log(TAG + "addr = " + addr);
console.log(TAG + "size = " + size);
Interceptor.attach(moduleBase.add(addr), {
onEnter: function (args) {
this.pid = Process.getCurrentThreadId();
// console.log(TAG + " ==== ZY_trace_Stalker_begin ==== ");
//看下結構體的值
Stalker.follow(this.pid, {
events:{
call:false,
ret:false,
exec:false,
block:false,
compile:false
},
onReceive:function(events){
},
transform: function (iterator) {
let lastInfo;
const instruction = iterator.next();
let startAddress = instruction.address;
// console.log(TAG + "startAddress:" + startAddress + " base:" + module.base );
if (size === 0) {
size = module.size;
addr = 0;
}
const isModuleCode = startAddress.compare(moduleBase.add(addr)) >= 0 &&
startAddress.compare(moduleBase.add(addr).add(size)) < 0;
do {
if (isModuleCode) {
// console.log(TAG + instruction.address + ":" + instruction);
let s = parserNextAddr(instruction);
let address = instruction.address;
let offset = address - moduleBase;
let lastInfo = s.toString(16) + "\t\t" + instruction;
detailInsMap.set(offset, JSON.stringify(instruction));
infoMap.set(offset, lastInfo);
iterator.putCallout(function (context) {
let regs = JSON.stringify(context);
if (isFirstIn) {
isFirstIn = false;
//保存寄存器
pre_regs = formatArm64Regs(context);
}
else {
//打印的實際是上一次的 這樣延遲一次可以打印出寄存器變化
let pcReg = getPcReg(pre_regs);
let offset = Number(pcReg) - moduleBase;
let logInfo = infoMap.get(offset);
let detailIns = detailInsMap.get(offset);
// log("detailIns:"+detailIns)
let entity = isRegsChange(context, detailIns);
console.log(TAG + logInfo + " ; " + entity.info, entity.color);
}
});
}
iterator.keep();
} while (iterator.next() != null);
},
});
},
onLeave: function (ret) {
// libtprt.saveStringMapTofile();
Stalker.unfollow(this.pid);
console.log(TAG + "ret:" + ret);
}
});
}
調用方法
ZY_trace_Stalker_begin('libencrypt.so',0x8EF4, 0x9C0C - 0x8EF4);
Tip:
Trace之前可以先匹配入參，只Trace指定的密文。然後unidbg 去 Trace 同樣的密文，這樣有利於比對。
對比結果
前戲鋪墊的太長了，總算拿到Trace Code的結果了。
1:main
這裏有個很奇怪的地方，
9608: "ldr w8, [x9, x8, lsl #2]" x9=0x40147510 x8=0x9094 => w8=0xf54de125
0x40147510 這個地址是在so的數據段。 這段代碼的意思是 從 0x40147510+(0x9094<<2) = 0x4016B760 這個地址取數據
m0x4016B760 >-----------------------------------------------------------------------------< [11:57:20 551]RW@0x4016b760[libencrypt.so]0x16b760, md5=cc2b1f1f88429f40f84599a613cf3143, hex=25e14df5a6ea8219a148998cebd3d9b5e55522c3109f9bd0347f27854da2729b83f3a390ce0c318645a588f14b339626692918f7119819acb36b0f92cd0dc4d596a74b1bc8f1263f2841c72757b265b4b1692c56a24a9c8f528a41e0d1d95149e25a0120a9e884147d223f7323eb4ff2 size: 112 0000: 25 E1 4D F5 A6 EA 82 19 A1 48 99 8C EB D3 D9 B5 %.M......H...... 0010: E5 55 22 C3 10 9F 9B D0 34 7F 27 85 4D A2 72 9B .U".....4.'.M.r.
從unidbg裏面打印一下，沒毛病。 就是 25 E1 4D F5
但是對應的App的結果就有點意思了
9608 ldr w8, [x9, x8, lsl #2] ; x8 = 0x90f7 --> 0x73b55372
0x40147510+(0x90f7<<2) = 0x4016B8EC
m0x4016B8EC >-----------------------------------------------------------------------------< [12:00:52 810]RW@0x4016b8ec[libencrypt.so]0x16b8ec, md5=cd71edc06f5f49b56a700c1f6e541610, hex=e35324c7bb9b61e3b06ee0f4f571fb062a44630bc501d369b49e3e2cee56eaeb463ab0c57e5c3b12a8abf8f81264047dd98a871bc1b84e9d807db83241a8ee1d0be8aeecd8e1328a7311b4a73e2c9b925f24946cc35eacb6953472a0b4cdc9baebce5c65701ab7afa0f48251f1e5afab size: 112 0000: E3 53 24 C7 BB 9B 61 E3 B0 6E E0 F4 F5 71 FB 06 .S$...a..n...q.. 0010: 2A 44 63 0B C5 01 D3 69 B4 9E 3E 2C EE 56 EA EB *Dc....i..>,.V..
這個地址對應的結果不對。 難道App會在內存中變異？
m0x4017B8EC >-----------------------------------------------------------------------------< [12:01:51 113]RW@0x4017b8ec[libencrypt.so]0x17b8ec, md5=09b5524828f471a42a3e75beed7b23a8, hex=7253b573f596a2d945a40787a842b3a0e46eadcc761474b12000e2a1ec0ab7053cca47f537ed81c4b823dc9866cc99a7b5b4b4adb3fffa867aa45080ea698ddb04e771872ee075f999b9ba241908bc5ac29666eb5f6a7800abee8213d52a28f19321df19b077a1716dbf3ae72a10f33f size: 112 0000: 72 53 B5 73 F5 96 A2 D9 45 A4 07 87 A8 42 B3 A0 rS.s....E....B.. 0010: E4 6E AD CC 76 14 74 B1 20 00 E2 A1 EC 0A B7 05 .n..v.t. .......
在unidbg的內存裏面搜索了一下，發現加上 0x10000 之後的值恰好是App裏顯示的一致。
真相只有一個
pc時代過來的老同學就很敏感了。這個so並不是原始so，而是我們在內存中dump出來的。
我們觀察下原始so的節表
fenfei$ greadelf -l libencrypt.so
Elf file type is DYN (Shared object file)
Entry point 0x3210
There are 5 program headers, starting at offset 64
Program Headers:
Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr
FileSiz MemSiz Flags Align
LOAD 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x000000000002f288 0x000000000002f288 R E 0x10000
LOAD 0x000000000002fba0 0x000000000003fba0 0x000000000003fba0
0x0000000000194a08 0x0000000000194ab8 RW 0x10000
DYNAMIC 0x00000000001c5b90 0x000000000003fc00 0x000000000003fc00
0x0000000000000210 0x0000000000000210 RW 0x8
readelf: Error: no .dynamic section in the dynamic segment
GNU_EH_FRAME 0x000000000002cd10 0x000000000002cd10 0x000000000002cd10
0x000000000000048c 0x000000000000048c R 0x4
LOAD 0x00000000001c5078 0x00000000001d5078 0x00000000001d5078
0x0000000000000afc 0x0000000000000afc R E 0x1000
文件地址 0x2fba0 映射到了 內存地址 0x3fba0
所以我們dump出來的so要修復這個映射
Program Headers:
Type Offset VirtAddr PhysAddr
FileSiz MemSiz Flags Align
LOAD 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000000000000
0x000000000002f288 0x000000000002f288 R E 0x10000
LOAD 0x000000000003fba0 0x000000000003fba0 0x000000000003fba0
0x0000000000194a08 0x0000000000194ab8 RW 0x10000
DYNAMIC 0x00000000001c5b90 0x000000000003fc00 0x000000000003fc00
0x0000000000000210 0x0000000000000210 RW 0x8
readelf: Error: no .dynamic section in the dynamic segment
GNU_EH_FRAME 0x000000000002cd10 0x000000000002cd10 0x000000000002cd10
0x000000000000048c 0x000000000000048c R 0x4
LOAD 0x00000000001c5078 0x00000000001d5078 0x00000000001d5078
0x0000000000000afc 0x0000000000000afc R E 0x1000
把我們dump出的so頭裏面的 0x2fba0 改成 0x3fba0
這次終於可以成功解密了
call decheckcode: {"code":"0","message":"success","respondData":{"serverTime":1663643024410,"timeSpan":"5","loginFlag":0}}
三、總結
忙活了老半天，其實最後只做了一下修復so文件頭。嚴格意義上只改了3個字節。
改3個字節很簡單，分析並知道如何改，再哪改，才是我們的重點。
Trace Function 、Trace Block 、Trace Code。逐漸縮小範圍來定位。
還可以通過不同的入參來TraceCode，對比一下更有助於分析算法。
1:ffshow
縱浪大化中 不喜亦不懼 應盡便須盡 無復獨多慮
「其他文章」
- 設計模式之狀態模式
- 如何實現數據庫讀一致性
- 我是怎麼入行做風控的
- C 11精要：部分語言特性
- 吳恩達來信：人工智能領域的求職小 tips
- EasyCV帶你復現更好更快的自監督算法-FastConvMAE
- 某車聯網App 通訊協議加密分析(四) Trace Code
- 帶你瞭解CANN的目標檢測與識別一站式方案
- EasyNLP玩轉文本摘要（新聞標題）生成
- PostgreSQL邏輯複製解密
- 基於 CoreDNS 和 K8s 構建雲原生場景下的企業級 DNS
- 循環神經網絡（RNN）可是在語音識別、自然語言處理等其他領域中引起了變革！
- 技術分享| 分佈式系統中服務註冊發現組件的原理及比較
- 利用谷歌地圖採集外貿客户的電話和手機號碼
- 跟我學Python圖像處理丨關於圖像金字塔的圖像向下取樣和向上取樣
- 帶你掌握如何使用CANN 算子ST測試工具msopst
- 一招教你如何高效批量導入與更新數據
- 一步步搞懂MySQL元數據鎖（MDL）
- 你知道如何用 PHP 實現多進程嗎？
- KubeSphere 網關的設計與實現（解讀）